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INTRODUCTION 
On April 21, 2016, the legendary recording artist and composer Prince died 
suddenly at the age of 57.1  In addition to shocking his fans, Prince’s unexpected 
death threw his family into disarray; because he died without a will and without a 
spouse, children, or surviving parents, many of Prince’s distant relatives reportedly 
scrambled to claim ownership over his estate.2  In the complicated process of valuing 
Prince’s estate, his family and Minnesota lawmakers realized that one of his most 
valuable assets was not protected under Minnesota law:  his right of publicity.3  The 
right of publicity, a person’s right to control the commercial use of his or her likeness, 
is recognized in some form in thirty-eight states.4  Approximately twenty-five of 
those states have laws protecting a person’s right of publicity after death, known as 
the postmortem right of publicity.5  When Prince died in 2016, however, Minnesota 
did not have a postmortem right of publicity statute.  In response to his death, state 
lawmakers rushed to pass the Personal Rights in Names Can Endure (“PRINCE”) 
Act, which would have expanded Minnesota’s right of publicity laws and created a 
retroactive postmortem provision applicable to deceased celebrities like Prince.6  
Although the PRINCE Act was abandoned after backlash from professional sports 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, Columbia Law School, Class of 2019.  Many thanks to Professor Philippa 
Loengard for her guidance in supervising this Note and to the 2017–18 and 2018–19 editorial staffs of the 
Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts for their thoughtful review. 
 1. Jon Pareles, A Singular, Meticulous Master of Pop Music and Stagecraft, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 
2016, at A1. 
 2. Ben Sisario, Prince Had No Will, Court Filing Reports, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2016, at C1; 
Prince’s Siblings to Inherit Singer’s $200m Estate, Judge Rules, GUARDIAN (UK) (May 19, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/5LHG-25CT; see also Prince’s Estate: Lawyers Tally Late Star’s Assets, Debts Behind 
Closed Doors, BILLBOARD (May 8, 2016), https://perma.cc/U2W6-MMK4 (discussing the difficulty 
posed by tallying Prince’s assets and verifying the blood relationship between Prince and various half-
siblings who came forward to claim ownership over his estate). 
 3. See Jennifer E. Rothman, Prince’s Death Sends Minnesota Legislature into Overdrive, 
ROTHMAN’S ROADMAP TO RIGHT OF PUBLICITY (May 10, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://perma.cc/HJ55-5WA2 
[hereinafter Rothman, RIGHT OF PUBLICITY ROADMAP] (noting the uncertain status of Minnesota’s right 
of publicity law at the time of Prince’s death). 
 4. See Rothman, The Law, RIGHT OF PUBLICITY ROADMAP, supra note 3, https://perma.cc/MZ3T-
HH3F (last visited Sept. 27, 2018) (noting that the states that currently do not recognize the right of 
publicity either by statute or common law are Alaska, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, 
Mississippi, Montana, North Carolina, North Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming). 
 5. Id.; see also Memorandum from Jennifer E. Rothman Opposing Assembly Bill A08155 (June 
8, 2017), https://perma.cc/QVA4-P9QJ [hereinafter Rothman, Memorandum Opposing A08155] (“It is 
true that approximately 25 states currently offer post-mortem rights in some form (some only to deceased 
soldiers)”).  
 6. H.F. 3994, 2016 H.R., 89th Sess. (Minn. 2016).  Some commentators have noted that, 
ironically, the PRINCE Act arguably would have violated its own provisions by using Prince’s name to 
promote the bill.  See, e.g., Mike Masnick, Minnesota’s Broad Publicity Rights Law, the PRINCE Act, So 
Broad that It May Violate Itself, TECHDIRT (May 10, 2016, 8:30 AM), https://perma.cc/K64T-UTQ7. 
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and other entertainment groups, the very introduction of the bill shows the enduring 
power of celebrity and the desire to change the law to protect artists’ legacies.7 
The controversy following Prince’s death also demonstrates the current 
uncertainty surrounding the postmortem right of publicity and the trend towards 
expanding right of publicity laws in many states.  In the spring of 2017, for example, 
the New York State Legislature introduced a bill similar to the PRINCE Act that 
would have created a postmortem right of publicity in New York.8  But going even 
further than the PRINCE Act, the proposed New York law contained a provision 
allowing any individual’s estate to bring claims for violations of that individual’s 
right of publicity in New York, regardless of whether the individual was domiciled 
in New York upon death.9  In the spring of 2018, the New York State Legislature 
reintroduced the 2017 postmortem bill.10  While the 2018 bill made some 
adjustments to the scope of the proposed postmortem right, it still allowed the estates 
of deceased individuals from any domicile to bring right of publicity claims in New 
York courts.11 
Currently, Indiana, Washington, and Hawaii have similar “all comers” provisions 
in their postmortem right of publicity statutes, which allow the estates of individuals 
who were domiciled out of state upon death to bring right of publicity claims in those 
states.12  These “all comers” provisions run counter to the traditional rule that the law 
of the state in which a person is domiciled at death controls whether they have a 
postmortem right of publicity.13  Such expansive postmortem right of publicity 
statutes create an extreme imbalance in the scope of rights of publicity between 
different states and encourage the heirs of celebrities like Prince to flock to specific 
states in an attempt to commoditize their relatives’ personas after death. 
This Note argues that current state postmortem right of publicity statutes are 
unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause.  The dormant Commerce 
Clause doctrine is an implicit restriction within the Commerce Clause that prohibits 
states from regulating interstate commerce.14  The current patchwork of state 
 
 7. Jacob Gershman, Critics Pounce on Proposed PRINCE Act in Minnesota, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG 
(May 16, 2016, 2:17 PM), https://perma.cc/2XNY-AT59. 
 8. N.Y. Assemb. B. No. A08155, 2017 Leg., 240th Sess. (N.Y. 2017); see also Jennifer E. 
Rothman, The Right of Publicity: Privacy Reimagined for New York?, 36 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 
573, 574 (2018) (noting that the “proposed bill would leave New York without an express privacy law, 
and would upend over a century of established privacy law in the state”). 
 9. N.Y. Assemb. B. No. A08155 § 50-g, 2017 Leg., 240th Sess. (N.Y. 2017) (“Every individual’s 
right of publicity shall continue to exist for forty years after his or her death…regardless of whether the 
law of the domicile…of the individual…recognizes a similar…property right.”). 
 10. N.Y. Assemb. B. No. A08155-B, 2018 Leg., 241st Sess. (N.Y. 2018) (as amended June 5, 
2018); see also Rothman, New York Right of Publicity Bill Resurrected Again, RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 
ROADMAP (June 6, 2018, 12:45 PM), https://perma.cc/BYN3-AM6P. 
 11. N.Y. Assemb. B. No. A08155-B § 50.1, 2018 Leg., 241st Sess. (N.Y. 2018) (defining 
“[d]eceased individual” as “any individual…who has died”). 
 12. Rothman, The Law, RIGHT OF PUBLICITY ROADMAP, supra note 3. 
 13. See THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 11:17 (2d ed. 2018) (“the 
nearly unanimous rule to determine the existence of a post-mortem right of publicity is to look to the law 
of the place of domicile at the time of death”). 
 14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES 
AND POLICIES § 5.3.1, 443–45 (5th ed. 2015) (summarizing dormant Commerce Clause doctrine). 
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postmortem right of publicity statutes violates the dormant Commerce Clause in two 
different ways.  
First, postmortem right of publicity laws containing “all comers” provisions like 
those in Indiana, Washington, and the proposed bill in New York violate the dormant 
Commerce Clause because they can be applied extraterritorially to the estates of non-
resident individuals.  By allowing non-resident estates to bring right of publicity 
actions, these laws can be used to stifle commerce occurring wholly outside of the 
state—precisely the sort of burden the dormant Commerce Clause prohibits.15 
Second, even those postmortem right of publicity laws that do not contain “all 
comers” provisions can violate the dormant Commerce Clause when applied to 
certain businesses operating without distinct geographic boundaries, such as 
websites.  Courts have struck down state laws regulating website content in the past 
under the dormant Commerce Clause, reasoning that such laws create de facto 
national regulation and impose the policy preferences of one state on other states in 
which a particular website can be accessed.16  The same principle can be applied to 
state postmortem right of publicity laws, which in effect require website operators 
using the likenesses of deceased individuals to tailor their business practices to the 
most expansive postmortem right of publicity provisions.  In this way, state 
postmortem right of publicity statutes impose significant costs on Internet content 
providers by adding another group of right holders with which those content 
providers must negotiate.  The desire to protect individuals from commercial 
exploitation after death—especially beloved celebrities like Prince—is 
understandable.  The dormant Commerce Clause, however, prohibits one state from 
designing the means by which that protection is afforded across the entire country.17   
This Note proposes that the only means of remedying the constitutional issue 
posed by the current patchwork of postmortem right of publicity statutes is through 
federal action.  Congress must either create a federal right of publicity or explicitly 
authorize states to create their own right of publicity laws. 
Part I traces the origination and evolution of state postmortem right of publicity 
laws over the past forty years, concluding with New York’s recently proposed bill.  
Part II examines current dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence and how the 
dormant Commerce Clause has been applied to invalidate extraterritorial state laws 
and regulations of the Internet.  Using the recently proposed bill in New York as a 
case study, Part III shows that:  (1) postmortem right of publicity laws with “all 
 
 15. See Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 337 (1989) (“[T]he ‘Commerce Clause…precludes the 
application of a state statute to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the State’s borders, whether 
or not the commerce has effects within the State.’” (quoting Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642–43 
(1982))). 
 16. See, e.g., Am. Libr. Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (striking down a state 
criminal law making it a crime to use a computer to disseminate obscene material to minors under the 
dormant Commerce Clause); Am. Booksellers Found. v. Dean, 342 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2003) (same); Am. 
Civ. Liberties Union v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 1999) (same). 
 17. See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 476 U.S. 573, 582 
(1986) (explaining that the dormant Commerce Clause prohibits one state from “project[ing] its 
legislation” into other states and creating a de facto nationwide regulatory system based on one state’s 
overly restrictive statute). 
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comers” provisions are facially unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce 
Clause; and (2) other postmortem right of publicity laws are unconstitutional as 
applied to Internet businesses.  Part III then concludes by suggesting that 
congressional consideration of the right of publicity is necessary to alleviate dormant 
Commerce Clause violations created by current state right of publicity statutes. 
I. THE POSTMORTEM RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 
The history of the postmortem right of publicity traces the development of 
American celebrity itself.18  As Americans became more enamored with stardom, the 
likenesses and personas of celebrities became one of their most valuable assets.  
Postmortem right of publicity laws first emerged in the early 1980s to protect the 
market for celebrity, and they have continually expanded ever since.  This section 
traces that evolution. 
A. DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY:  FROM PRIVACY TO 
CELEBRITY 
The right of publicity has its origins in the right of privacy, which was first 
proposed by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in their seminal Harvard Law 
Review article The Right to Privacy.19  Responding to what they perceived as 
inadequate protection of personal privacy against unwanted intrusion by the press, 
Warren and Brandeis conceived of the right of privacy as the right of individuals to 
control what kinds and how much of their expression is available to the public.20  In 
1902, the New York Court of Appeals became the first court to consider a right of 
privacy claim in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co.21  In Roberson, the plaintiff 
sued a flour mill for using her portrait on their products without her permission.22  
Finding that the flour mill did not libel the plaintiff, the Court of Appeals refused to 
recognize the plaintiff’s novel right of privacy claim.23  The New York State 
Legislature swiftly responded to the decision by enacting a statutory right of privacy 
in 1903, which prohibited the unauthorized use of a person’s likeness “for the 
purposes of trade.”24  Thus began the pattern of state legislatures enacting laws to 
 
 18. See Mark Bartholomew, A Right is Born: Celebrity, Property, and Postmodern Lawmaking, 44 
CONN. L. REV. 301, 301 (2011) (noting that the prevailing understanding of the right of publicity is that it 
developed in tandem with the growing commodification of celebrity in the U.S.). 
 19. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 198–99 
(1890); see also JENNIFER E. ROTHMAN, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: PRIVACY REIMAGINED FOR A PUBLIC 
WORLD (2018) [hereinafter ROTHMAN, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY]; Martin H. Redish & Kelsey B. Shust, 
The Right of Publicity and the First Amendment in the Modern Age of Commercial Speech, 56 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1443, 1451 (2015). 
 20. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 19, at 198–99. 
 21. ROTHMAN, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY, supra note 19, at 22–25. See Roberson v. Rochester 
Folding Box Co., 62 N.E. 442 (1902), superseded by statute, N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50–51 (McKinney 
1903). 
 22. Roberson, 64 N.E. at 442. 
 23. Id. 
 24. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50–51 (McKinney 1903) (amended 1921). 
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protect individuals’ likenesses in response to what they perceived as unjust 
commercial exploitation.  Early identity misappropriation claims remained moored 
to their privacy roots over the next four decades, and William Prosser set out the 
invasion of privacy tort in the Restatement (First) of Torts in 1939.25 
 The modern right of publicity was born in a decision written by Judge Jerome 
Frank in Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum.26  In Haelan, a baseball player 
granted a chewing gum company the exclusive right to use his photograph, but a rival 
company later convinced the player to let them use his photograph as well.27  In 
upholding the original gum company’s claim against its rival for inducing a breach 
of contract, the Second Circuit coined the term “right of publicity” and held that the 
right existed independent of the right of privacy.28  By recognizing the right of 
publicity as an independent property right divorced from any invasion of personal 
privacy, Haelan paved the way for a new market surrounding the commodification 
of one’s likeness.29  In 1972, California became the first state to enact a statute 
expressly protecting the right of publicity,30 and in 1977, in Zacchini v. Scripps-
Howard, the Supreme Court formally recognized the right of publicity as rooted in 
economic considerations separate from privacy.31  In Zacchini, the Supreme Court 
severed the right of publicity from its privacy tort origins and analogized it to 
copyright and patent protection, thereby signaling to lower courts that the right of 
publicity should be treated as an independent property right.32 
After the right of publicity became perceived as an independent property right, it 
was only a matter of time before courts considered whether the right of publicity was 
descendible after death like other property interests.  In 1979, the California Supreme 
Court considered for the first time whether the right of publicity could live on after 
an individual’s death in Lugosi v. Universal Pictures.33  Lugosi considered whether 
the widow of Bela Lugosi, an actor famous for portraying Dracula in 1930, was 
entitled to profits made by Universal Studios in exploiting the “uniquely individual 
 
 25. Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can Learn from Trademark 
Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1169 (2006); see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 867 (1939). 
 26. Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953). 
 27. Id. at 867. 
 28. Id. at 868. 
 29. See Kevin L. Vick & Jean-Paul Jassy, Why a Federal Right of Publicity Statute Is Necessary, 
28 COMM. L. 14, 14 (2011) (describing the explosion in right of publicity laws and lawsuits following the 
Haelan decision); see also Joseph R. Grodin, Note, The Right of Publicity:  A Doctrinal Innovation, 62 
YALE L.J. 1123, 1127 (1953) (student Note published soon after the Haelan decision, recognizing that 
Haelan took an important step in clearly setting out the right of publicity as a doctrine concerned with 
economic, not privacy, interests). 
 30. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344; see MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 6:23 (describing the origins of 
California’s right of publicity statute). 
 31. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977) (“Ohio’s decision to protect 
petitioner’s right of publicity here rests on more than a desire to compensate the performer for the time 
and effort invested in his act; the protection provides an economic incentive for him to make the 
investment required to produce a performance of interest to the public.  The same consideration underlies 
the patent and copyright laws long enforced by this Court.”). 
 32. Vick & Jassy, supra note 29, at 15; ROTHMAN, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY, supra note 19, at 81. 
 33. 603 P.2d 425 (1979). 
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likeness and appearance of Bela Lugosi in the role of Count Dracula.”34  Lugosi’s 
widow argued that because Lugosi had a protectable property interest in his 
individual likeness separate from Universal’s copyright in the movie Dracula, that 
property interest passed to her upon Lugosi’s death in 1956.35  While the trial court 
initially ruled in her favor, the California Supreme Court rejected her claim, 
reasoning that creating a postmortem right of publicity would neither serve “society’s 
interest in the free dissemination of ideas” nor would it incentivize individuals to 
commercialize their likenesses during their lifetimes.36  Thus, the California 
Supreme Court held that “the right to exploit name and likeness is personal to the 
artist and must be exercised, if at all, by him during his lifetime.”37 
At the same time that the estate of Dracula fought over his right of publicity in 
California, the estate of “the King” fought over the use of his likeness in Tennessee.38  
When Elvis Presley died in 1977, he was one of the most identifiable celebrities in 
the world, and his heirs sought to protect his likeness from being used without his 
estate’s permission.39  Like in Lugosi, in Memphis Development Foundation v. 
Factors Etc., Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the right 
of publicity did not survive an individual’s death in Tennessee.40  Similar to the 
court’s reasoning in Lugosi, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that creating a postmortem 
right of publicity would not create any greater economic incentives for an individual 
to commercialize his or her likeness during life, and since the right of publicity had 
been severed from its dignitary and privacy roots, only the economic rationale could 
be used to justify any expansion of existing rights.41  After several other courts also 
declined to grant the Presley estate a postmortem right of publicity, the Tennessee 
State Legislature leapt into action by passing Tennessee’s Personal Rights Protection 
Act of 1984 (“PRPA”), known as the “Elvis law.”42  The PRPA prohibits the 
unauthorized commercial use of an individual’s “name, photograph, or likeness in 
 
 34. Id. at 427. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 431. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See Elvis Presley, ROCK & ROLL HALL OF FAME (last visited Dec. 23, 2017) (“Elvis Presley is, 
quite simply, the king of Rock & Roll.”), https://perma.cc/MX2G-VFNG. 
 39. See Brittany Adkins, Crying Out for Uniformity: Eliminating State Inconsistencies in Right of 
Publicity Protection Through a Uniform Right of Publicity Act, 40 CUMB. L. REV. 499, 512–13 (2009) 
(describing how Elvis’s death sparked litigation surrounding the existence of a postmortem right of 
publicity in Tennessee). 
 40. See Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 959 (1980). 
 41. Id. (“The desire to exploit fame for the commercial advantage of one’s heirs is . . . a weak 
principle of motivation.  It seems apparent that making the right of publicity inheritable would not 
significantly inspire the creative endeavors of individuals in our society.”). 
 42. See, e.g., Eric J. Goodman, A National Identity Crisis:  The Need for a Federal Right of 
Publicity Statute, 9 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL’Y 227, 239 (1999) (“[T]he Tennessee statute 
is affectionately referred to as ‘Elvis law’ which is very favorable to a plaintiff like Graceland.”); see also 
Annie T. Christoff, Long Live the King:  The Influence of Elvis Presley on the Right of Publicity in 
Tennessee, 41 U. MEM. L. REV. 667, 696 (2011) (noting that PRPA was also sponsored by the Presley 
estate). 
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any medium” for ten years after death, and like Minnesota’s failed PRINCE Act, it 
demonstrates the power of local celebrities to move state legislatures to action.43 
Less than a year after Tennessee enacted the PRPA, California passed its own 
postmortem right of publicity law, the Celebrities Rights Act of 1985, after 
significant lobbying by the Screen Actors Guild.44  Similar to the PRPA, the 
California Celebrities Rights Act was recognized as a piece of legislation designed 
to overrule the Lugosi decision and support the estates of the many celebrities who 
died in California.45  Over the next decade, other states passed even more expansive 
postmortem right of publicity statutes, with Oklahoma and Indiana even creating a 
duration of 100 years for their postmortem publicity rights.46 
Mirroring the growth in states recognizing the postmortem right of publicity, 
courts also began interpreting the scope of the right of publicity more broadly, most 
notably the Ninth Circuit.47  In Midler v. Ford Motor Co., for example, the Ninth 
Circuit held that Bette Midler had a viable California common law right of publicity 
claim against Ford for impersonating her singing in an advertisement.48  Six years 
later, in White v. Samsung, the Ninth Circuit upheld Vanna White’s common law 
right of publicity claim against Samsung for using a robot that called to mind her 
image in a VCR commercial.49  By the start of the new millennium, the right of 
publicity had therefore grown far beyond its roots in the right of privacy a century 
earlier.  It represented a powerful tool for individuals and their estates to control and 
commercialize individuals’ likenesses long after death.  Furthermore, because 
celebrities’ likenesses are in the highest demand, most of the litigation defining the 
scope of the right was driven by celebrity estates.  In the early 2000s, however, only 
a minority of states recognized the postmortem right of publicity.50  Thus, while 
powerful, the postmortem right of publicity was an unreliable tool, and some 
celebrities fell victim to the patchwork nature of state laws.  The most notable of 




 43. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1104 (2014); see also Adkins, supra note 39, at 513 (describing 
the scope of the PRPA). 
 44. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 990 (1985), revised at CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1 (1999); MCCARTHY, 
supra note 13, § 6:24. 
 45. MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 6:24. 
 46. See, e.g., TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 26.012(d) (West 2000); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12 §§ 1448–1449 
(2010); IND. CODE § 32-36-1-8 (2002); see also Bartholomew, supra note 18, at 316–17 (describing the 
rapid growth of postmortem right-of-publicity statutes following Tennessee and California). 
 47. See Bartholomew, supra note 18, at 319 (describing the more expansive judicial attitude toward 
publicity rights starting in 1988). 
 48. See Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988) (“To impersonate [Midler’s] 
voice is to pirate her identity.”). 
 49. See White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 50. See MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 9:17 (surveying state postmortem right of publicity laws). 
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B. VARIATION IN THE POSTMORTEM RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AND RESULTING 
LITIGATION 
Because most postmortem right of publicity statutes were passed either in reaction 
to the death of a local celebrity or after direct lobbying by the estate of an individual 
with a valuable right of publicity, each new statute contains minor variations that 
make national adherence costly and unpredictable.51  As it stands today, there are 
four primary variations between different states’ approach to the postmortem right 
of publicity.  First, at least two states (New York and Wisconsin) have explicitly 
rejected the postmortem right of publicity altogether.52  Second, the statutory term 
for the postmortem right of publicity varies significantly between different 
jurisdictions, from ten years in Tennessee to 100 years in Indiana and Oklahoma.53  
Third, each postmortem statute has a different scope of protection, including how 
many years it applies retroactively (if at all), whether the protection extends only to 
names and likenesses or whether it also covers gestures and an individual’s overall 
“personality,” and whether an individual needs a commercially valuable persona to 
receive protection.54  For example, Washington’s postmortem right of publicity 
period lasts ten years for ordinary individuals but is extended to seventy-five years 
for “personalities,” defined as “any individual whose name, voice, signature, 
photograph, or likeness has commercial value.”55  Finally, three states (Indiana, 
Washington, and Hawaii) have taken the extraordinary step of expressly extending 
their postmortem right of publicity to the estates of any individuals, even if they were 
domiciled in other jurisdictions when they died.56  While these “all comers” 
provisions still require some violation of an individual’s right of publicity within the 
state, they have prompted litigation over whether they are constitutionally overbroad, 
though no court has definitively ruled on the issue.57 
 
 51. See Vick & Jassy, supra note 29, at 16 (explaining that some of the most expansive postmortem 
right of publicity statutes, like Indiana’s, were authored by representatives for celebrity estates and 
suggesting that the state-by-state approach invites forum shopping). 
 52. MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 9:18; accord Smith v. Long Island Jewish-Hillside Med. Ctr., 
499 N.Y.S.3d 167, 168 (2d Dep’t 1986) (holding that New York does not recognize a postmortem right 
of publicity); Hagen v. Dahmer, 1995 WL 822644, at *4 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 13, 1995) (holding that 
Wisconsin’s right of publicity statute and common law right of publicity are limited to living persons). 
 53. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1104 (2014); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12 §§ 1448–1449 (2010); IND. 
CODE § 32-36-1-8 (2002). See also Rothman, RIGHT OF PUBLICITY ROADMAP, supra note 3 (surveying 
postmortem right of publicity terms). 
 54. See Vick & Jassy, supra note 29, at 16 (describing the lack of uniformity among state right of 
publicity laws). 
 55. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 63:60:020(8), 63:30:040 (2008). 
 56. See IND. CODE § 32-36-1-1(a) (2002) (“This chapter applies to an act or event that occurs within 
Indiana, regardless of a personality’s domicile, residence, or citizenship.”); WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 
63:60:010 (2008) (“The property right does not expire upon the death of the individual or personality, 
regardless of whether the law of the domicile, residence, or citizenship of the individual or personality at 
the time of death or otherwise recognizes a similar or identical property right.”); HAW. REV. STAT. § 482P-
2 (2010) (“This chapter is intended to apply to all individuals and personalities, living and deceased, 
regardless of place of domicile or place of domicile at time of death.”). 
 57. See Part I.C., infra. 
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All of these complicated variations in state law collided in a series of cases 
involving Marilyn Monroe’s postmortem right of publicity.  In 1994, the Indiana 
legislature enacted the broadest postmortem right of publicity statute up until that 
point after significant lobbying by CMG Worldwide, the company that controls 
Marilyn Monroe’s estate.58  The 1994 statute created an expansive scope of 
protection that extended 100 years after death and purported to apply to any 
individual, regardless of his or her domicile at death.59 
In 2007, CMG attempted to capitalize on this broad “all comers” provision by 
bringing a claim under Indiana’s postmortem right of publicity law even though 
Marilyn Monroe died in California and her estate was probated in New York.60  CMG 
sued a merchandise company that made t-shirts bearing Monroe’s image and the 
operators of a website offering the t-shirts for sale.61  Even though neither the 
merchandise company nor the website operators were based in Indiana, CMG argued 
that the Indiana postmortem right of publicity statute should apply because one of 
the t-shirts was sold at a Target in Indianapolis and the website was accessible within 
Indiana.62  In Shaw Family Archives v. CMG Worldwide, the court rejected CMG’s 
claim, holding that neither New York, California, nor Indiana had a postmortem right 
of publicity at the time of Monroe’s death in 1962, and therefore Monroe could not 
dispose of her right of publicity by will.63  Because neither California nor Indiana’s 
postmortem statutes applied retroactively in 2007, the Shaw court was able to decide 
the case on narrow grounds and avoid considering the constitutionality of Indiana’s 
“all comers” provision.64  The court also did not decide whether Monroe was a 
domiciliary of California or New York upon her death.65  Shaw therefore answered 
few questions about the future of postmortem right of publicity and whether 
Monroe’s estate was entitled to such a right. 
In direct response to Shaw, the California legislature amended its postmortem 
statute in 2007 to apply retroactively to any individual domiciled in California upon 
his or her death.66  This sweeping revision paved the way for CMG to bring a second 
lawsuit under California law in an attempt to vindicate Monroe’s postmortem right 
of publicity.  In Milton H. Greene Archives, Inc. v. CMG Worldwide, CMG claimed 
that the heirs of a photographer had violated Marilyn Monroe’s postmortem right of 
publicity by distributing photographs of Monroe in California, arguing that the 
 
 58. See Vick & Jassy, supra note 29, at 16 (explaining that the CEO of CMG is recognized as the 
principle author of the 1994 statute). 
 59. See IND. CODE § 32-36-1-1(a) (1994); see also Adkins, supra note 39, at 518 (describing the 
Indiana statute as a novel and “sweeping” expansion). 
 60. See Shaw Fam. Archives Ltd. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 2d 309, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 
2007) (describing New York and California “the only possible domiciles of Ms. Monroe at the time of her 
death”). 
 61. Id. at 313. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 314. 
 64. Id. at 314–15. 
 65. Id. at 315 (“[I]t is not necessary to resolve the question of domicile because neither New York 
nor California . . . permitted a testator to dispose by will of property she does now own at the time of her 
death.”). 
 66. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1(b), (o)–(p) (West 2012); Adkins, supra note 39, at 509 n.56. 
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revised California postmortem statute applied retroactively to Monroe.67  In 2012, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit disagreed, holding that the revised 
statute did not apply to Monroe because she was domiciled in New York, not 
California, when she died.68  The court reasoned that CMG was estopped from 
arguing that Monroe died a domiciliary of California because Monroe’s estate had 
previously represented that she died a domiciliary of New York in order to avoid 
California’s substantial estate taxes.69  Granting Monroe a postmortem right of 
publicity under California law, the court explained, would unfairly give Monroe’s 
estate a “second advantage.”70  
Thus, even after two state legislatures passed postmortem statutes motivated by 
protecting Marilyn Monroe’s postmortem right of publicity, her estate has thus far 
been unsuccessful in asserting that postmortem right because she died as a 
domiciliary of New York.  In 2007, the New York state legislature proposed a 
postmortem right of publicity statute that would have made New York’s law 
essentially identical to Indiana’s, and which would have applied retroactively to 
Monroe.71  However, after opposition from media organizations, among others, the 
bill was withdrawn.72  The litigation over Monroe’s estate is a key example of the 
broad impact of inconsistent postmortem right of publicity statutes between states.  
For companies seeking to make use of individuals’ likenesses, it can be expensive 
and time consuming to determine whether and for how long an image or even name 
is protected.  And for celebrities and other individuals seeking to protect their right 
of publicity after death, Shaw and Greene show that a simple error in establishing 
the wrong domicile can eliminate one’s postmortem right of publicity altogether.  
C. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS:  JIMI HENDRIX, ALL COMERS, AND THE NEW 
YORK PROPOSAL 
While the courts in Shaw and Greene avoided deciding whether Indiana’s 
postmortem statute violated the dormant Commerce Clause, recent decisions have 
more directly addressed constitutional concerns with these laws.  The most notable 
of these cases concerned the estate of Jimi Hendrix and Washington’s postmortem 
right of publicity statute.73  
Following the pattern of many other states that expanded their postmortem 
provisions to protect local celebrities, Washington amended its right of publicity 
 
 67. See Milton H. Greene Archives, Inc. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1155 
(C.D. Cal. 2008). 
 68. See Milton H. Greene Archives, Inc. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., 692 F.3d 983, 1000 (9th Cir. 
2012). 
 69. Id. at 987. 
 70. Id. at 999. 
 71. See S.B. 6005, 2007 Leg., 230th Sess. (N.Y. 2007); Assemb. B. 8836, 2007 Leg., 230th Sess. 
(N.Y. 2007). 
 72. See Bartholomew, supra note 18, at 363 (arguing that one of the main reasons the 2007 
amendments failed was due to opposition by movie studios). 
 73. See Experience Hendrix, L.L.C. v. Hendrixlicensing.com, 766 F. Supp. 2d 1122 (W.D. Wash. 
2011), rev’d 762 F.3d 829 [hereinafter Hendrix I]; Experience Hendrix L.L.C. v. Hendrixlicensing.com 
Ltd., 762 F.3d 829 (9th Cir. 2014) [hereinafter Hendrix II]. 
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statute, the Washington Personality Rights Act (“WPRA”), in 2008 for the benefit of 
Jimi Hendrix.74  In 2007, Hendrix’s estate lost a Washington-based lawsuit over 
Hendrix’s postmortem right of publicity because Hendrix was domiciled in New 
York when he died.75  In response, the Washington legislature passed an “all comers” 
amendment to the WPRA modeled after Indiana’s postmortem statute that extended 
the right to all individuals regardless of domicile upon death.76  Unlike Indiana’s 
original statute, however, the 2008 amendments applied retroactively and were 
specifically designed to grant a postmortem right of publicity to Jimi Hendrix.77  
Within a year after the amendments were passed, representatives of Hendrix’s estate 
entered into a lawsuit that would test the constitutionality of Washington’s new “all 
comers” provision.  
In Experience Hendrix L.L.C. v. Hendrixlicensing.com (“Hendrix I”), Experience 
Hendrix, a licensing company that managed several Jimi Hendrix trademarks and 
operated websites on behalf the Hendrix estate, sued a merchandise distributor for 
trademark infringement.78  Although Experience Hendrix’s claims were rooted in the 
Lanham Act, not the WPRA, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of 
Washington determined that it had to rule on whether the amended WPRA applied 
to Hendrix’s estate to decide the case.79  The Hendrix I court held that the WPRA 
did not apply to Jimi Hendrix because the 2008 WPRA amendments were 
unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause, the Due Process Clause, and 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause.80  The court reasoned that because the 2008 
amendments allowed the WPRA to apply to any deceased individual regardless of 
domicile, the law sought to govern transactions occurring wholly outside 
Washington state, such as right-of-publicity transfers via will or intestate 
succession.81  This, the Hendrix I court held, was an unconstitutional extraterritorial 
application under the dormant Commerce Clause.82  
 
 74. See Robert Rossi, Note, Jurisdictional Haze: Indiana and Washington’s Unconstitutional 
Extensions of the Postmortem Right of Publicity, 57 B.C. L. REV. 297, 319–20 (2016) (discussing the 2007 
WPRA amendments); see also Aubrie Hicks, Note, The Right to Publicity After Death:  Postmortem 
Personality Rights in Washington in the Wake of Experience Hendrix v. Hendrixlicensing.com, 36 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 275, 282 (same).  Although Jimi Hendrix spent most of his musical career in New 
York, he grew up in Seattle, Washington, where he played his first instrument, an old one-string ukulele 
he found in the trash.  See LEON HENDRIX & ADAM MITCHELL, JIMI HENDRIX: A BROTHER’S STORY 56–
58 (2012). 
 75. See Experience Hendrix L.L.C. v. James Marshall Hendrix Foundation, 240 F. App’x 739, 740 
(9th Cir. 2007). 
 76. See WASH. REV. CODE § 63.60.010 (amended 2008). 
 77. See Hicks, supra note 74, at 282. 
 78. See Hendrix I, 766 F. Supp. 2d, at 1127–28. 
 79. Id. at 1130 (“Because a ruling that Experience now possesses a post-mortem right of publicity 
associated with Jimi Hendrix would resolve most, if not all, of defendants’ counterclaims in Experience’s 
favor, the Court must first address whether the WPRA applies and, if so, whether the 2008 amendments 
to the statute are constitutional.”). 
 80. Id. at 1141–43. 
 81. Id. at 1142. 
 82. Id.  For a more detailed explanation of the extraterritoriality doctrine of the dormant Commerce 
Clause, see infra notes 131–47 and accompanying text. 
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On appeal (“Hendrix II”), the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court’s dormant 
Commerce Clause holding under the rationale that the case at issue involved only 
commerce taking place within Washington state.83  In dicta, the Hendrix II court 
recognized that the 2008 amendments to the WPRA had troublingly broad potential 
applications.84  However, because the record did not demonstrate any affected 
commerce outside the state of Washington, the court concluded that the case did “not 
implicate those possible broader applications of the WPRA.”85   
Thus, the court in Hendrix II avoided striking down the WPRA amendments under 
the dormant Commerce Clause because it was able to limit the controversy to specific 
transactions taking place only in Washington.  Unlike the District Court, the Ninth 
Circuit took a very narrow view of the WPRA and refused to look at the potential 
extraterritorial effects of the law.  Hendrix II ultimately left undecided the issue of 
whether “all comers” provisions like the one in the WPRA would be unconstitutional 
as applied to defendants operating businesses interstate or without distinct 
geographic boundaries.  By leaving this dormant Commerce Clause question 
unanswered and upholding the WPRA, Hendrix II opened the door for other states 
to try their hands at similarly broad postmortem right of publicity statutes.86  
On May 31, 2017, the New York State Assembly introduced a postmortem right 
of publicity bill that almost precisely mirrored the 2008 amendments to the WPRA.87  
This proposed bill, Assembly Bill No. A08155, was not the first time that New York 
tried to introduce a postmortem right of publicity.88  The bill came closer than the 
previous proposed bills to passing, however, due to initial cooperation from media 
representatives like the MPAA.89  Nevertheless, after intense opposition from 
organizations like the Electronic Frontier Foundation and the New York Civil 
Liberties Union, the New York State Legislature did not move forward with the 
original 2017 bill.90  Instead, on June 6, 2018, the legislature introduced a revised 
version of the bill, Assembly Bill No. A08155-B.91  Even though the 2018 bill 
slightly narrowed the scope of the 2017 bill, because New York does not currently 
 
 83. Hendrix II, 762 F.3d at 835 (“Under the narrow, non-speculative circumstances presented by 
this case, we disagree with the district court’s ruling and accordingly reverse.”). 
 84. Id. at 836 (“Washington’s approach to post-mortem personality rights raises difficult questions 
regarding whether another state must recognize the broad personality rights that Washington provides.”). 
 85. Id. at 836 n.4; see also id. at 837 (“Nor does the record suggest that the application of the WPRA 
to the limited, non-speculative controversy at issue here would otherwise impermissibly burden interstate 
commerce.”). 
 86. See Rossi, supra note 74, at 322 (noting that the Ninth Circuit’s decision could have dramatic 
ripple effects on other courts and legislatures across the country). 
 87. See Assemb. B. 8155-B, 2017 Leg., 240th Sess. (N.Y. 2017); see also Jennifer E. Rothman, 
New York Once Again Floats Right of Publicity Law, ROTHMAN’S ROADMAP TO THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 
(June 7, 2017, 12:45 PM), https://perma.cc/RR6J-XXSM [hereinafter Rothman, New York Postmortem 
Law]. 
 88. Rothman, New York Postmortem Law, supra note 87. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Jennifer E. Rothman, New York Legislature Feels the Heat and Pulls Right of Publicity Bill, 
ROTHMAN’S ROADMAP TO THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY (June 21, 2017, 9:15 PM); see also Rothman, 
Memorandum Opposing A08155, supra note 5; Electronic Frontier Foundation, Memorandum in 
Opposition to A08155, June 12, 2017, https://perma.cc/KE2E-MTJV.. 
 91. See N.Y. State Assemb. B. No. A08155-B, 2018 Leg., 241st Sess. (N.Y. 2018). 
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have a postmortem right of publicity, the 2018 bill would have brought about a 
massive overhaul in New York right of publicity laws.92  
In particular, the 2018 bill would have made four significant changes to New 
York’s right of publicity, which raise similar constitutional concerns to those raised 
by the 2008 WPRA amendments in Washington.  First, Assembly Bill A08155-B 
proposed a new postmortem right prohibiting unauthorized use of a deceased 
individual’s “persona” (defined as an individual’s “name, portrait or picture, voice, 
or signature”) for advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade for forty years 
after death.93  Second, the bill made an individual’s right of publicity freely 
transferable and descendible via contract, testamentary document, or intestate 
succession during an individual’s life or by his or her heirs.94  Third, the proposed 
bill contained an “all comers” clause that would have made the law applicable to any 
deceased individual, regardless of that person’s domicile upon death.95  While the 
revised 2018 bill removed some language from the 2017 bill that expressly extended 
jurisdiction to all deceased persons regardless of domicile, the revised bill still lacked 
a New York domicile requirement, thereby creating a cause of action for deceased 
individuals from any jurisdiction.96  Finally, the 2018 bill explicitly prohibited the 
unauthorized use of an individual’s “digital replica” in a pornographic work.97  This 
“digital replica” provision, new to the 2018 version of the bill, was meant to target 
so-called “deep fakes,” videos in which the faces of celebrities and public figures are 
superimposed onto another’s body using artificial intelligence.98  
Like the 2017 bill before it, the New York State Legislature failed to pass the 2018 
bill after facing renewed opposition from a coalition of media and civil rights 
groups.99  With pressure from organizations like SAG-AFTRA to create a 
 
 92. See Rothman, Memorandum Opposing A08155B, supra note 5 (noting that Assembly Bill 
A08155 would upend over 100 years of New York case law regarding New York’s “right of privacy” 
under New York Civil Rights Law §§ 50–51). 
 93. Assemb. B. 8155-B, 2018 Leg., 241st Sess. §§ 50.8, 50-f, 50-g (N.Y. 2018). 
 94. Id., § 50-h(a)–(f). 
 95. Id., § 50.1 (defining “Deceased individual” as “any individual . . . who has died”). 
 96. See Shubha Ghosh, Letter in Opposition to Assembly Bill No. A08155-B, June 11, 2018, 
https://perma.cc/FFH7-5WYK (explaining that  the bill allowed individuals representing the estates of 
individuals who had died anywhere in the world to bring lawsuits in NY); Electronic Frontier Foundation, 
Memorandum in Opposition to Assembly Bill 8155-B, June 8, 2018, https://perma.cc/FFH7-5WYK; 
Association of National Advertisers, Letter in Opposition to Assembly Bill No. A08155-B, June 8, 2018, 
https://www.rightofpublicityroadmap.com/sites/default/files/pdfs/association_of_national_advertisers_o
pp_a8155b.pdf (noting that the bill was not limited to New York domiciles and urging the legislature to 
add such a domicile requirement); Warner Brothers Entertainment Inc., Letter in Opposition to Assembly 
Bill No. A08155-B, June 7, 2018, https://perma.cc/RF7B-K93H (arguing that the lack of a domicile 
requirement in the 2018 bill “invites an overwhelming volume of unnecessary litigation that will 
overburden New York courts”). 
 97. Assemb. B. 8155-B, § 51.4, 2018 Leg., 241st Sess. (N.Y. 2018). 
 98. Eriq Gardner, Disney Comes Out Against New York’s Proposal to Curb Pornographic 
“Deepfakes”, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (June 11, 2018, 4:01 PM), https://perma.cc/24RF-U9AZ. 
 99. Judy Bass, New York Right of Publicity Bill Passage Drama Ends with No Action by State 
Senate, ENTERTAINMENT, ARTS AND SPORTS LAW BLOG (June 25, 2018, 9:28 AM), 
https://perma.cc/A7EA-AGL5; Electronic Frontier Foundation, Memorandum in Opposition to A08155-
B, supra note 96 (noting that the coalition in opposition to the bill “is so broad that it has brought together 
groups such as EFF and the MPAA, which hold opposing views on a wide range of other policy issues”). 
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postmortem right of publicity for the many actors and other celebrities who have died 
in New York, however, a revised version of the bill will inevitably be introduced.  If 
such a bill passes, and especially if it contains an “all comers” provision like the 
statutes in Indiana, Washington, and Hawaii, New York courts will have to contend 
with the broad, extraterritorial impact of a New York postmortem right of publicity.  
The Ninth Circuit was only able to avoid deciding whether the WPRA violated the 
dormant Commerce Clause because of the narrow intrastate transactions at issue in 
Hendrix II.  It is only a matter of time before a case arises in which the controversy 
cannot be so carefully cabined. 
II. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE 
Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o 
regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.”100  Although this Commerce 
Clause does not explicitly limit the power of state legislatures, courts have long held 
that it implicitly limits the ability of states to regulate interstate commerce, often 
referred to as the “dormant Commerce Clause” doctrine.101  Over time, the Supreme 
Court has created a two-tiered framework for determining whether state legislation 
violates the dormant Commerce Clause.  “Tier-one” laws are state laws that evince 
a protectionist purpose or explicitly discriminate against out-of-state businesses.  
These laws are submitted to strict scrutiny and are often held to be per se 
unconstitutional.102  “Tier-two” laws are those laws that are facially 
nondiscriminatory, but which indirectly burden interstate commerce.  Tier-two laws 
are analyzed under a less scrutinizing balancing test that examines whether the 
burden on interstate commerce clearly exceeds the local benefits of the state law.103  
The Supreme Court has also identified a third category of state laws that violate the 
dormant Commerce Clause:  laws that have the practical effect of regulating business 
conduct occurring wholly outside a state’s borders.104  These laws are deemed 
“extraterritorial” and are subjected to the same “tier-one” strict scrutiny as facially 
discriminatory laws.105 
This section describes the current state of the dormant Commerce Clause and how 
courts use the doctrine to invalidate state legislation burdening interstate commerce.  
Part II.A. discusses the basic two-tier approach to the dormant Commerce Clause 
doctrine.  Part II.B. examines the extraterritoriality doctrine and how courts have 
 
 100. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 101. See, e.g., Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 315–21 (1852); see also CTS Corp. v. 
Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 87 (1987) (explaining that for over a century, courts have interpreted 
the Commerce Clause as implicitly limiting state action); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1030 (3d ed. 2000) (describing the history of the dormant Commerce Clause 
doctrine). 
 102. See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 578–79 (1986) 
(describing the Supreme Court’s two-tiered approach to the dormant Commerce Clause). 
 103. Id. 
 104. See Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 332 (1989) (discussing the development of the 
extraterritoriality doctrine under the dormant Commerce Clause framework); see also CHEMERINSKY, 
supra note 14, at 466–67 (same). 
 105. See TRIBE, supra note 101, at 1074. 
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struggled with incorporating it into the basic two-tier framework.  Part II.C. looks at 
how courts have repeatedly invoked the extraterritoriality doctrine and the other two 
branches of dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence to invalidate state laws 
regulating the Internet. 
A. THE BASIC TWO-TIER FRAMEWORK:  DISCRIMINATORY LAWS AND THE 
PIKE BALANCING TEST 
The primary justification behind the modern dormant Commerce Clause doctrine 
is to prevent states from enacting protectionist legislation giving in-state businesses 
an unfair economic advantage over out-of-state businesses.106  Though the doctrine 
has its critics,107 it maintains an established place in Commerce Clause jurisprudence 
and is seen as fulfilling the Framers’ desire to eliminate “economic Balkanization” 
among the states.108  Consistent with that purpose, state laws that facially or 
purposefully discriminate against out-out-state economic interests—also known as 
“tier-one” laws—are subjected to the highest form of judicial scrutiny.109  Facially 
discriminatory laws can only withstand strict scrutiny under the dormant Commerce 
Clause if there are no less discriminatory alternatives for achieving the same 
“purported legitimate local purpose.”110  Tier-one laws rarely withstand this strict 
scrutiny analysis; indeed, the Supreme Court has upheld such a law only once.111  
Thus, if a law facially discriminates against out-of-state economic interests, it is 
typically considered “virtually per se invalid under the Commerce Clause” even if it 
serves valid in-state interests.112 
The clearest illustrations of “tier-one” state laws involve cases in which a law 
explicitly imposes economic restrictions on out-of-state businesses.  In Granholm v. 
Heald, the Supreme Court held that a Michigan law allowing only in-state wineries 
to send wine to customers via mail was facially discriminatory and violated the 
dormant Commerce Clause.113  Other times, the Supreme Court has invalidated laws 
designed to limit the access of state resources to out-of-state businesses.  In Hughes 
v. Oklahoma, for example, the Supreme Court struck down an Oklahoma law 
prohibiting the transportation or shipping of minnows caught in Oklahoma for sale 
 
 106. See New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273 (1988) (“This ‘negative’ aspect of 
the Commerce Clause prohibits economic protectionism––that is, regulatory measures designed to benefit 
in-state economic interests by out-of-state competitors.”). 
 107. See, e.g., Comptroller of the Treas. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1808 (2015) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (calling the dormant Commerce Clause “a judicial fraud” and “utterly illogical”). 
 108. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1794. 
 109. Limbach, 486 U.S. at 273. 
 110. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979) (“At a minimum such facial discrimination 
invokes the strictest scrutiny of any purported legitimate local purpose and of the absence of 
nondiscriminatory alternatives.”). 
 111. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986); Erwin Chemerinsky et al., California, Climate 
Change, and the Constitution, 25 ENVTL. F. July/Aug. 2007, 50, 54 (explaining that Maine v. Taylor 
involved the only “tier-one” law upheld by the Supreme Court). 
 112. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986). 
 113. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 492–93 (2005). 
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outside the state.114  The Hughes court recognized that even though Oklahoma had a 
valid interest in protecting its wildlife, the dormant Commerce Clause permitted 
Oklahoma to pursue that interest “only in ways consistent with the basic principle 
that ‘our economic unit is the Nation.’”115 
State laws that regulate evenhandedly and only have an indirect effect on 
interstate commerce—sometimes referred to as “tier-two” laws—are subject to a less 
searching balancing test codified in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.116  Under the Pike 
balancing test, a facially neutral state law will be upheld unless its burden on 
interstate commerce is “clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”117  
In applying this balancing test, courts consider, among other factors, whether the 
state law serves a legitimate state interest, whether any less burdensome regulatory 
alternatives exist, and whether the alleged benefits of the law outweigh the impact 
on interstate commerce.118 
Although the Pike balancing test involves a highly subjective inquiry that makes 
predicting the outcome of a case difficult,119 courts afford state legislatures 
substantial discretion under the Pike test, making it more likely that a tier-two law 
will survive judicial scrutiny than a tier-one law.120  For example, in CTS Corp. v. 
Dynamics Corp. of America, the Supreme Court upheld a facially nondiscriminatory 
Indiana law under the Pike balancing test.121  The law limited hostile takeovers of 
Indiana corporations by requiring a majority of disinterested shareholders to approve 
any transaction by which a purchaser obtained “control shares” in an Indiana 
corporation before that purchaser could obtain voting power in the corporation.122  
Dynamics, a non-Indiana corporation that had attempted a hostile takeover of CTS 
(an Indiana corporation), challenged the constitutionality of the Indiana anti-takeover 
statute, alleging that it violated the dormant Commerce Clause because it 
discriminated against out-of-state businesses that wanted to acquire Indiana 
corporations.123  The Supreme Court first held that the Indiana law was not a facially 
discriminatory “tier one” law because “it ha[d] the same effects on tender offers 
whether or not the offeror is a domiciliary or resident of Indiana.”124  It then held that 
the anti-takeover law survived the Pike balancing test for two reasons.  First, because 
the law only placed voting restrictions on tender offers for Indiana corporations, 
rather than prohibiting those tender offers outright, the burden on interstate 
commerce was minimal.125  Second, this minimal burden was clearly outweighed by 
 
 114. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 337–38. 
 115. Id. at 339 (quoting H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 537 (1949)). 
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Indiana’s strong, valid interest “in promoting stable relationships among parties 
involved in the corporations it charters.”126 
Despite the lesser scrutiny imposed on “tier-two” laws, the Supreme Court has 
invalidated some state legislation under the Pike balancing test when it has 
determined that those laws unduly encroach on interstate commerce.  In Pike itself, 
the Supreme Court refused to apply an Arizona law requiring that cantaloupes grown 
in Arizona also be packed within the state before being sold.127  The plaintiff in Pike 
was a harvesting company that grew cantaloupes in Arizona but owned packing and 
processing facilities thirty-one miles away in California.128  Under the Arizona Fruit 
and Vegetable Standardization Act, it was prohibited from hauling its cantaloupes 
into California to pack them for nationwide distribution.129  The plaintiff argued that 
the Arizona law imposed an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce as 
applied to the plaintiff’s shipping business.  The Supreme Court agreed.  The Pike 
court held that Arizona’s “tenuous” interest in maintaining the quality and reputation 
of its local produce was outweighed by the heavy burden imposed on the plaintiff, 
who would have had to spend approximately $200,000 building a new packing plant 
within Arizona’s borders.130  Thus, in situations where a regulation imposes clearly 
excessive burdens on a business’s interstate economic activities, it will be struck 
down even if it is motivated by benefitting local individuals or businesses. 
B. THE EXTRATERRITORIALITY DOCTRINE 
The extraterritoriality doctrine is a third, less understood, branch of dormant 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence.131  Unlike the traditional dormant Commerce 
Clause framework, which focuses on economic protectionism, the extraterritoriality 
doctrine is primarily concerned with state laws that have practical repercussions 
beyond their state borders and which create costly inconsistency between different 
state legislative schemes.132  The Supreme Court has held that the extraterritoriality 
doctrine dictates three principles:  (1) the dormant Commerce Clause prohibits state 
statutes that apply to commerce occurring wholly outside the state’s borders, whether 
or not the commerce has effects within the state; (2) a statute that has the practical 
effect of regulating commerce wholly outside the state is unconstitutional regardless 
of the legislature’s intent in passing the statute; and (3) the practical effects of such 
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statutes must be considered in relation to the regulatory schemes of other states and 
what the consequences would be if every State adopted similar legislation.133 
If state statutes are found to regulate extraterritorially, courts submit the laws to 
the same strict scrutiny that they apply to facially discriminatory “tier-one” laws.134  
Like tier-one laws, extraterritorial laws rarely, if ever, survive constitutional scrutiny, 
and some courts have held that such laws are per se unconstitutional.135  Courts are 
likely to find that legislation violates the extraterritoriality doctrine where two 
elements are present:  (1) the statute has the practical effect of applying to economic 
activities wholly outside the state; and (2) the statute creates inconsistent regulatory 
burdens in comparison to other states.136  Thus, the central concern animating the 
extraterritoriality doctrine is preventing one state from essentially creating a national 
regulatory scheme by enacting laws that have sweeping effects for businesses 
operating interstate.137 
Courts have relied on the extraterritoriality doctrine to strike down legislation 
under the dormant Commerce Clause that otherwise does not facially discriminate 
against out-of-state economic interests and would survive the Pike balancing test.  In 
Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority, the Supreme 
Court struck down a New York law that required liquor producers to charge no higher 
price to New York distributors than they had charged anywhere else in the United 
States in a particular month.138  The court held that New York law did not expressly 
discriminate against out-of-state producers and that it served the strong state interest 
in ensuring the lowest prices for New York residents, which would weigh in favor of 
upholding the law under the Pike balancing test.139  Thus, the law survived under 
both tiers of the traditional dormant Commerce Clause framework.  However, the 
court still struck down the law under the dormant Commerce Clause because the 
price control had the practical effect of preventing liquor producers from lowering 
their prices anywhere else in the country below what they charged in New York in 
response to market conditions.140  “While New York may regulate the sale of liquor 
within its borders,” the court explained, “it may not ‘project its legislation into [other 
States] by regulating the price to be paid’ for liquor in those States.”141 
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The court in Brown-Forman also supported its determination that the New York 
law had unconstitutional extraterritorial effects by pointing out that it would subject 
liquor producers to inconsistent obligations in different states.142  While the existence 
of inconsistent obligations alone does not automatically render each state statute 
unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause, if a new statute departs 
significantly from the practices of other states—thereby imposing costly regulatory 
burdens on interstate commerce—this can support a finding of extraterritoriality.143  
For example, in NCAA v. Miller, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
struck down a Nevada statute that required national collegiate athletic associations 
to provide additional due process protections in proceedings against Nevada 
universities.144  The Ninth Circuit held that the Nevada statute at issue had 
unconstitutional extraterritorial effects on interstate commerce because it risked 
conflicting with similar laws in other states.145  The court explained that “[t]he 
serious risk of inconsistent obligations wrought by the extraterritorial effect of the 
Statute demonstrates why it constitutes a per se violation of the Commerce 
Clause.”146 
The extraterritoriality doctrine therefore represents a potent third branch of the 
dormant Commerce Clause.  It can be used to strike down expansive state legislation 
that, although facially neutral, and which might otherwise survive the Pike balancing 
test, still risks imposing significant burdens on interstate commerce.  Although it is 
not as deeply rooted in economic protectionism as the other two strands of dormant 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the extraterritoriality doctrine is still designed to 
prevent the morass of burdensome and discriminatory state legislation that the 
Framers sought to eliminate.147 
C. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE AND THE INTERNET 
The dormant Commerce Clause has especially important implications for state 
regulations that affect commerce occurring without distinct geographic borders, such 
as commerce over the Internet.148  Two areas in particular have received attention 
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from courts concerning the dormant Commerce Clause and the Internet.  First, 
although the Supreme Court has never addressed the question, several lower courts 
have struck down Internet regulations under the extraterritoriality doctrine.  Second, 
the Supreme Court has established certain rules with regard to how states can impose 
taxes on out-of-state businesses under the dormant Commerce Clause.  Lower courts 
have extended this Supreme Court precedent to invalidate state taxes on e-commerce.  
This section will address each of these two doctrinal lines and how courts have 
struggled to adapt the dormant Commerce Clause to the digital age. 
The pioneering case to rely on the extraterritoriality doctrine to strike down an 
Internet regulation was American Libraries Association v. Pataki.149  In American 
Libraries, a group of organizations that used the Internet to distribute content 
challenged the constitutionality of a New York statute making it illegal to use a 
computer to disseminate obscene material to children.150  The plaintiffs argued that 
the anti-obscenity statute violated the dormant Commerce Clause by regulating 
economic activity occurring wholly outside of New York.151  Representatives for the 
state of New York disagreed, arguing that the statute targeted intrastate conduct.152  
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled in favor of the 
plaintiffs, holding that by regulating Internet communication, the New York statute 
had the practical effect of regulating interstate commerce.153  The court explained 
that because “[t]he Internet is wholly insensitive to geographic distinctions[,]… no 
aspect of the Internet can feasibly be closed off to users from another state.”154  The 
court held that because of the lack of clear geographic boundaries on the Internet, the 
New York law violated the extraterritoriality doctrine of the dormant Commerce 
Clause by creating a de facto nationwide regulation for businesses operating over the 
Internet.155  The court explained that the New York law also violated the 
extraterritoriality doctrine by threatening to create a patchwork of conflicting 
regulations nationwide.156  The court explained that “certain types of commerce 
demand consistent treatment and are therefore susceptible to regulation only on a 
national level,” and the Internet represented one of those areas.157  American 
Libraries therefore demonstrated how the two central concerns of the 
extraterritoriality doctrine, projecting legislation onto other states and creating 
inconsistent regulatory burdens, can be used to invalidate statutes affecting Internet 
commerce. 
 
96 (1999) (same).  But see Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 785, 787 (2001) (taking issue with the growing consensus in the early 2000s that 
the dormant Commerce Clause required invalidation of state Internet regulations). 
 149. Am. Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 150. Id. at 163–64. 
 151. Id. 169–70. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 170. 
 154. Id. at 170–71. 
 155. Id. at 176. 
 156. Id. at 181. 
 157. Id. 
RONALD, POSTMORTEM RIGHT OF PUBLICITY STATUTES, 42 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 123 (2018) 
144 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [42:1 
The American Libraries court also held that even if the New York law was not a 
per se violation of the dormant Commerce Clause because of its extraterritorial 
effects, it also failed the Pike balancing test.158  The court agreed that New York had 
a valid interest in protecting children against obscene material, but the statute at issue 
imposed an extreme burden on interstate commerce by censoring communication 
over the Internet.  The court explained that “the chilling effect that [the Act] produces 
is bound to exceed the actual cases that are likely to be prosecuted, as Internet users 
will steer clear of the Act by significant margin.”159  In sum, this chilling effect had 
a significant enough impact on Internet businesses to outweigh any local benefits 
provided by the New York legislation, thus failing the Pike balancing test.160 
In 2003, the Second Circuit built upon American Libraries’ dormant Commerce 
Clause reasoning in American Booksellers Foundation v. Dean.161  In American 
Booksellers, a group of website operators alleged that a Vermont statute similar to 
the one at issue in American Libraries violated the dormant Commerce Clause.  Like 
the American Libraries court, the Second Circuit in American Booksellers held that 
the Vermont statute at issue ran afoul of the extraterritoriality doctrine.162  The court 
recognized that the architecture of the Internet posed a significant challenge to states 
seeking to further their valid interest in eliminating the distribution of pornography 
to children.  Because of the Internet’s “boundary-less nature,” the court explained, 
Internet commerce does not occur wholly outside of Vermont in the same literal 
sense as it does in other extraterritoriality cases.163  Nevertheless, the Vermont law 
created inconsistent regulatory burdens for Internet businesses and had the practical 
effect of significantly inhibiting interstate commerce.164  Thus, as applied to the 
defendants’ websites, the Vermont law was a per se violation of the dormant 
Commerce Clause under the extraterritoriality doctrine.165  American Libraries and 
American Booksellers are not the only two cases that invoke the extraterritoriality 
doctrine to strike down laws affecting the Internet.166  But they are two of the clearest 
illustrations of how courts have applied the extraterritoriality doctrine in the digital 
age.  
The second important realm in which the dormant Commerce Clause has been 
applied to the Internet is with regard to “Amazon laws.”  Amazon laws, referencing 
the Internet retailer, are state laws that attempt to impose taxes on sales over the 
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Internet while still adhering to restrictions imposed by Supreme Court precedent and 
federal legislation.167  The litigation surrounding these Amazon laws over the past 
decade in many ways mirrors the development of state postmortem right of publicity 
statutes, including their conflict with the dormant Commerce Clause. 
In National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of State of Illinois, the 
Supreme Court held that the dormant Commerce Clause prohibited Illinois from 
requiring a mail order seller in Missouri to collect a “use tax” for merchandise sold 
and shipped into Illinois.168  A “use tax” is analogous to a sales tax and is typically 
imposed on purchases made by a state’s residents from out of state sellers.169  In 
Bellas, the Supreme Court held that Illinois’ use tax on remote mail order sellers 
discriminated against out of state businesses in violation of the dormant Commerce 
Clause.170  “The very purpose of the Commerce Clause,” the Bellas court explained, 
“was to ensure a national economy free from such unjustifiable local entanglements.  
Under the Constitution, this is a domain where Congress alone has the power of 
regulation and control.”171  
In 1992, the Supreme Court revisited Bellas in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota.172  In 
Quill, the court reaffirmed the holding from Bellas and held that in order for a state 
tax to survive dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny, it may only be imposed on 
business entities that have a physical presence in the state.173  The Quill court 
reasoned that a physical presence was required under the dormant Commerce Clause 
to “protect interstate commerce from intolerable or even undesirable burdens” 
imposed by a quagmire of different state use tax regimes.174  
Although neither Bellas nor Quill applied specifically to the Internet, Congress 
saw how the “physical presence” requirement of Quill could be used to shield 
Internet companies from discriminatory state use taxes.  In 1998, Congress built upon 
the Supreme Court’s holding in Quill by enacting the Internet Tax Freedom Act 
(“ITFA”).175  Congress’s goal in enacting the ITFA was to avoid subjecting Internet 
businesses to burdensome tax regulations in all fifty states merely because they chose 
to sell their goods through an electronic medium.  The ITFA Senate Committee 
Report explained that “[t]he benefits to be gained by the surge in electronic 
commerce could be stifled by the haphazard imposition of multiple and confusing 
State and local taxes that apply only to Internet related transactions and services.”176  
While the ITFA did not prohibit states from imposing taxes uniformly on both 
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Internet and brick and mortar businesses—only “discriminatory” taxes levied against 
Internet companies—it still demonstrated Congress’s intent to build upon the 
dormant Commerce Clause reasoning of Quill and minimize the minefield of 
different tax regimes specifically targeted at online retailers.177 
The existence of Quill and the ITFA has not stopped states from attempting to tax 
Internet businesses, however.  For example, in 2008, New York passed a so called 
“click-through nexus” statute designed to satisfy the requirements of Quill and the 
ITFA but still collect taxes from certain Internet businesses.  The statute imposes a 
use tax on any businesses (including Internet businesses without brick and mortar 
stores in New York) that “solicit[] business” through “employees, independent 
contractors, agents or other representatives” in New York state.178  Under the law, a 
use tax may be imposed on an Internet business even if that business’s only contact 
with New York is entering into a referral agreement in which a New York based 
business simply posts a link to the non-New York business on its website.179 
In 2012, Overstock and Amazon brought a lawsuit alleging that the New York tax 
was facially unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause because violated 
the physical presence requirement of Quill.180  They argued that the dormant 
Commerce Clause prohibited applying the use tax to Overstock and Amazon because 
they merely placed links for their websites on the websites of affiliates that had a 
physical presence in New York.181  The New York Court of Appeals rejected the 
Internet retailers’ claim, holding that when Internet businesses place links on the 
websites of New York based affiliates, they are engaging in “[a]ctive, in-state 
solicitation that produces a significant amount of revenue.”182  Thus, because the 
commercial activity of these businesses was done through other businesses with a 
physical presence in New York, the tax did not violate Quill or the dormant 
Commerce Clause.183 
On June 21, 2018, the Supreme Court put an end to the Quill physical presence 
rule in South Dakota v. Wayfair.184  But rather than bring clarity to the Court’s 
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, Wayfair arguably introduced even more 
uncertainty about how lower courts should analyze “Amazon laws” in the future.  In 
Wayfair, the Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Supreme Court of South 
Dakota, which had applied the Quill physical presence rule to invalidate a South 
Dakota statute requiring out of state sellers (including Internet retailers without a 
brick and mortar store in South Dakota) to collect a use tax.185  In his majority 
opinion, Justice Kennedy remarked that “[e]ach year, the physical presence rule 
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becomes further removed from economic reality,” and that this anachronism—
among other factors relevant to stare decisis—justified expressly overruling Quill.186  
Despite overruling Quill’s physical presence rule, the Court in Wayfair gave no 
further guidance to lower courts that must grapple with dormant Commerce Clause 
challenges to similar “Amazon laws.”  At the end of his opinion, Justice Kennedy 
wrote, “The question remains whether some other principle in the Court’s Commerce 
Clause doctrine might invalidate the Act.”187  It therefore remains to be seen whether 
more aggressive Internet tax laws than the South Dakota law at issue could be 
invalidated under other dormant Commerce Clause doctrines, such as the Pike 
balancing test.188   
As demonstrated by the examples of state Internet laws struck down under the 
extraterritorial doctrine and the uncertainty of “Amazon laws” in the wake of 
Wayfair, the dormant Commerce Clause at the very least complicates states’ efforts 
to regulate commerce over the Internet.  Though there have been efforts by states to 
circumvent the limitations imposed by the dormant Commerce Clause, courts remain 
leery of states interfering with the Internet, which by its very nature crosses state 
lines and does not recognize geographic boundaries.189  As the court explained in 
American Libraries, “certain types of commerce demand consistent treatment and 
are therefore susceptible to regulation only on a national level.”190  As discussed in 
the following section, like state Internet regulations, state postmortem right of 
publicity statutes fall squarely within the category of laws that substantially burden 
interstate economic activity and should therefore be subjected to constitutional 
scrutiny.  Furthermore, when those postmortem statutes are applied to Internet 
businesses, they are especially problematic and should be struck down under the 
dormant Commerce Clause. 
III. THE POSTMORTEM RIGHT OF PUBLICITY MEETS THE 
DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE 
Since the postmortem right of publicity first emerged in the early 1980s, courts, 
companies seeking to use the likenesses of deceased individuals, and the estates of 
those individuals have grappled with the complications arising from the postmortem 
right of publicity.  Unlike a simple flat fee or tax, the postmortem right of publicity 
has developed into a powerful property right that the estates of deceased individuals 
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can use to completely halt unauthorized commercial activity.191  As these 
postmortem statutes have proliferated, each state has developed its own right of 
publicity scheme, leading to inconsistencies nationwide that impose a significant 
burden on interstate commerce.  This section argues that state postmortem right of 
publicity statutes in their current form violate the dormant Commerce Clause and 
that federal legislation is necessary to alleviate the issue.  It uses the proposed 2018 
New York postmortem right of publicity statute, Assembly Bill No. A08155-B, as a 
case study, illustrating how such a law could be challenged under the dormant 
Commerce Clause.  Part III.A. demonstrates that postmortem statutes containing “all 
comers” provisions violate the dormant Commerce Clause under the 
extraterritoriality doctrine and the Pike balancing test.  Part III.B. shows that any 
postmortem right of publicity statute violates the dormant Commerce Clause as 
applied to Internet commerce.  Part III.C. argues that in order to rectify these 
constitutional violations, Congress must pass legislation either delegating authority 
to state legislatures or preempting current state postmortem right of publicity statutes.  
A. “ALL COMERS” PROVISIONS ARE FACIALLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
Assembly Bill No. A08155-B contains an “all comers” provision that not only 
grants a postmortem right of publicity for individuals who died in New York, but 
also to any individual, regardless of whether the state the individual died in 
recognized such a right upon death.192  Even though the proposed bill requires 
unauthorized use of a deceased individual’s likeness occurring inside New York in 
order for there to be a violation of the postmortem right of publicity, the bill’s “all 
comers” provision would still violate the dormant Commerce Clause for two reasons.  
First, it would violate the extraterritoriality doctrine by having “the practical effect 
of…control[ling] conduct beyond the boundaries of the State” regardless of “whether 
or not the commerce has effects within the State.”193  Second, it would fail the Pike 
balancing test by imposing a burden on interstate commerce that is “clearly excessive 
in relation to the putative local benefits.”194  Thus, even though the proposed New 
York bill does not expressly discriminate against out of state economic interests—
which would subject it to “tier-one” strict scrutiny under the dormant Commerce 
Clause framework—it still is facially unconstitutional because of the “all comers” 
choice of law provision.195 
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By creating a new property right for deceased individuals who died outside of 
New York, the New York statute has the potential to control and inhibit commerce 
occurring wholly outside of New York.  For example, take the case of a Minnesota 
manufacturer who wanted to create memorabilia depicting Prince.196  Because Prince 
died in Minnesota and Minnesota does not currently recognize the postmortem right 
of publicity, the manufacturer ordinarily would not be subject to a postmortem right 
of publicity claim from Prince’s estate.  However, if New York law were to grant 
Prince such a right, the Minnesota manufacturer would now have to comply with 
New York law if it wanted to sell its products to a national distributor.  Furthermore, 
if other states were to enact similar retroactive postmortem statutes, the manufacturer 
would have to contend with a minefield of jurisdictions in which it could potentially 
face liability or be subject to an injunction.  Because the scope of each of these 
postmortem rights of publicity could be slightly different, the manufacturer’s 
business operations would be burdened by having to navigate exactly which products 
bearing Prince’s likeness it could sell.  As the Supreme Court explained in Healy v. 
Beer Institute, the extraterritoriality doctrine is designed to prohibit precisely this 
type of “inconsistent legislation arising from the projection of one state regulatory 
regime into the jurisdiction of another state.”197  Thus, the proposed New York “all 
comers” postmortem statute––and others like it––violate the dormant Commerce 
Clause by having a stifling extraterritorial effect on commerce occurring in different 
states. 
Furthermore, the New York statute’s “all comers” provision creates an entire 
market for postmortem publicity rights that did not previously exist, which could 
affect commercial transactions occurring outside of New York.  The proposed bill 
makes an individual’s postmortem right of publicity freely transferable by contract, 
which would allow an individual’s heirs to license that individual’s right of 
publicity.198  Some states have explicitly prohibited such transfers of the right of 
publicity, but the New York statute would essentially override those states’ policy 
decisions in creating a new market for postmortem publicity rights.199 
The extraterritorial effects of the proposed New York postmortem statute closely 
resemble the effects of the California Resale Royalty Act (“CRRA”) at issue in Sam 
Francis Found. v. Christies.200  Sam Francis considered a dormant Commerce 
Clause challenge to the CRRA, which required sellers of fine art to pay a five percent 
royalty to the artist who made the work if the seller resided in California or the sale 
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took place in California.201  The Ninth Circuit held that the CRRA violated the 
extraterritoriality doctrine by applying to fine art sales occurring wholly outside of 
California and that the five percent royalty was therefore facially invalid under the 
dormant Commerce Clause.202  The court reasoned that by the CRRA’s plain 
language, it would apply to an art auction in New York and involve a royalty payment 
to an artist living in any state, so long as the seller was a California resident.  Such 
an application was clearly prohibited under the extraterritoriality doctrine.203 
While the proposed New York postmortem right of publicity statute only prohibits 
unauthorized commercial use of the postmortem right of publicity within New York, 
it would still have the effect of governing activity outside of New York like the 
CRRA.  As illustrated above with the hypothetical Minnesota memorabilia 
manufacturer, the New York law would have the practical effect of cutting off a 
whole series of commercial transactions to national distributors that otherwise would 
be permissible.  Much like how the CRRA imposed a fee on fine art sales occurring 
wholly outside of California between parties with few ties to California, Assembly 
Bill No. A08155-B would affect non-New York businesses contracting with non-
New York individuals.  This sort of projection of New York legislation onto other 
jurisdictions is precisely what the extraterritoriality doctrine prohibits.204 
Even if the proposed New York bill’s “all comers” provision does not violate the 
dormant Commerce Clause per se under the extraterritoriality doctrine, it fails the 
balancing formula set forth in Pike v. Bruce Church.205  Far from establishing 
regulations to protect the health and wellbeing of New York residents, New York 
does not have a legitimate interest in creating a new postmortem right of publicity 
for all individuals regardless of domicile or even citizenship.  The proposed New 
York law would allow individuals’ estates with no prior contact with New York to 
bring lawsuits in the state based on a broad postmortem right of publicity that roughly 
half of the states do not endorse.206  Regardless of the policy rationales behind the 
postmortem right of publicity, New York does not have a valid interest in extending 
such a right to individuals with no prior economic relationship with New York.  
Lacking such a legitimate interest, the burdens imposed on interstate commerce by 
“all comers” provisions clearly outweigh any local benefits and fail the Pike 
balancing test. 
B. ALL POSTMORTEM STATUTES ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED TO 
INTERNET COMMERCE 
Expansive postmortem right of publicity laws like New York’s Assembly Bill 
A08155-B create a particularly great challenge for businesses operating over the 
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Internet.  As explained by the Second Circuit in American Booksellers, the 
“boundary-less” nature of the Internet makes it very difficult for businesses engaging 
in Internet commerce to adhere to conflicting state regulations.207  As demonstrated 
by the years of litigation surrounding Marilyn Monroe’s estate, states are currently 
sharply divided regarding the scope, term, and even existence of the postmortem 
right of publicity.208  New York’s proposed bill, then, would have the practical effect 
of stifling interstate commerce for companies engaged in economic activity over the 
Internet and would violate the dormant Commerce Clause.  Like “all comers” choice-
of-law provisions, as applied to Internet commerce, all postmortem right of publicity 
laws both violate the extraterritoriality doctrine and fail the Pike balancing test. 
 First, postmortem statutes violate the extraterritoriality doctrine as applied to 
Internet businesses because they have the practical effect of regulating interstate 
commerce.  The primary advantage of Internet commerce is that businesses can 
establish one centralized web portal that applies uniformly across the Internet.  Using 
the same hypothetical merchandise manufacturer as in Part III.A., supra, that 
manufacturer might choose to set up a website to sell its Prince memorabilia over the 
Internet.  If a New York postmortem right of publicity law prohibited that 
manufacturer from selling Prince memorabilia to customers in New York state 
without the authorization of the Prince estate, it would effectively prohibit the 
manufacturer from operating its website altogether.  As applied to even this basic 
form of Internet commerce, postmortem right of publicity laws would have the 
practical effect of inhibiting economic activity occurring in other states, therefore 
violating the extraterritoriality doctrine. 
Because not all states recognize the postmortem right of publicity, postmortem 
statutes may also violate the extraterritoriality doctrine as applied to Internet 
businesses by subjecting them to inconsistent regulations.209  As explained in Section 
II.C., supra, in American Booksellers, the Second Circuit struck down a Vermont 
Internet obscenity statute in part because it would have made it impractical for the 
plaintiffs to conform to differing state legislation simultaneously.210  The court 
reasoned that the architecture of the Internet “imperatively demand[ed] a single 
uniform rule,” with reference to the dissemination of obscene material to minors and 
that state legislation like Vermont’s violated the dormant Commerce Clause.211  The 
current patchwork nature of state postmortem right of publicity statutes mirrors the 
inconsistent obscenity statutes at issue in American Booksellers.  Therefore, the same 
logic can be used to argue that state postmortem right of publicity laws run afoul of 
the extraterritoriality doctrine as applied to Internet commerce. 
Second, even if postmortem right of publicity statutes like New York’s proposed 
bill do not violate the extraterritoriality doctrine, they fail the Pike balancing test as 
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applied to Internet businesses.  As explained in Section II.C., supra, the Southern 
District of New York held in American Libraries that the Internet obscenity statute 
at issue failed the Pike balancing test in part because it produced a chilling effect on 
Internet communication, “as Internet users will steer clear of the Act by a significant 
margin.”212  This chilling effect had the practical result of creating burdens to Internet 
commerce that outweighed New York’s local interest in preventing the dissemination 
of obscene material to minors.213  Postmortem right of publicity statutes create a 
similar chilling effect when applied to Internet commerce.  Assuming that states have 
a valid interest in extending the right of publicity after death for its own residents,214 
this interest is outweighed by the chilling effects such statutes have on Internet 
businesses.  Even with proper First Amendment protections in place, businesses 
operating over the Internet may refrain from selling products or making 
advertisements that are lawful out of fear that they may run afoul of postmortem 
statutes.  This is especially the case with postmortem rights of publicity, which can 
have terms lasting as long as 100 years after death.215  Thus, all postmortem right of 
publicity statutes fail the Pike balancing test as applied to Internet businesses because 
they impose burdens on Internet commerce that are “clearly excessive in relation to 
the putative local benefits.”216 
Businesses recognize the excessive burdens that right of publicity laws can place 
on Internet commerce, and they are beginning to challenge the application of such 
laws on dormant Commerce Clause grounds.  For example, in Dobrowolski v. 
Intelius, several website operators argued that their use of plaintiffs’ likenesses in 
Internet advertisements should not be prohibited under the Illinois Right of Publicity 
Act (IRPA) because such an application would violate the dormant Commerce 
Clause.217  Because the district court resolved the dispute on First Amendment 
grounds, it did not reach defendants’ dormant Commerce Clause arguments.218  
Nevertheless, it is easy to see how applying the IRPA to websites on the grounds that 
they displayed advertisements using individuals’ likenesses would impose a 
significant burden on interstate commerce.  Allowing such right of publicity statutes 
to apply to Internet businesses without any ties to the state other than targeted 
advertisements would essentially force Internet businesses to comply with the most 
restrictive state right of publicity laws.  This is especially true in the case of 
postmortem right of publicity laws, where certain states (like Indiana and Oklahoma) 
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have such expansive postmortem terms that Internet businesses cannot afford to risk 
that deceased individuals might be retroactively covered. 
Finally, postmortem right of publicity statutes like New York’s proposed bill add 
an additional level of restriction on Internet businesses by granting plaintiffs the 
option of injunctive relief.219  If the estates of deceased individuals in states with 
exceptionally broad postmortem statutes are able to restrain an Internet business’s 
commercial use of their likenesses within that state, this effectively enjoins the 
Internet business’s use of their likeness in all jurisdictions because of the 
decentralized, boundary-less architecture of the Internet.220  Thus, such postmortem 
laws effectively allow one state to control the national right of publicity regime to 
which Internet businesses must adhere.  This projection of one state’s policy 
preferences upon business activities in other jurisdictions is exactly the type of 
overreaching legislation the dormant Commerce Clause forbids.221 
C. FEDERAL LEGISLATION IS NECESSARY TO RECTIFY DORMANT COMMERCE 
CLAUSE VIOLATIONS 
In order to solve the dormant Commerce Clause violations posed by current 
postmortem right of publicity statutes, Congress must consider the postmortem right 
of publicity.  Even if courts were to strike down “all comers” provisions and apply 
the traditional rule that the law of an individual’s domicile at death dictates one’s 
postmortem right of publicity, there still exists the extraterritorial issues posed by 
applying these laws to Internet businesses.  There are two means by which Congress 
could resolve these constitutional concerns with state postmortem right of publicity 
laws.  First, it could pass a federal right of publicity statute with a definitive 
postmortem provision.  Second, it could pass legislation authorizing current state 
right of publicity laws.  Such legislation would signal to states that Congress has 
delegated its constitutional authority under the Commerce Clause and is content to 
allow states to legislate in the sphere of postmortem publicity rights. 
The precise contours of a federal right of publicity statute are beyond the scope of 
this Note.222  But in order for such a federal statute to sufficiently address the dormant 
Commerce Concerns with current state legislation, it would have to include at least 
four primary components with reference to the postmortem right of publicity.  First, 
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it would have to address whether such a right should even exist after death, 
remedying the current split between states.223  Second, if such a right were to exist, 
the federal statute would have to set a uniform term for the postmortem right of 
publicity, in comparison to the significant variation between current state statutes.224  
Third, the federal statute would have to address whether or not the postmortem right 
of publicity applied retroactively and for how long.225  Finally, in order to resolve 
the current conflict among the states, a federal statute would have to specify whether 
the postmortem right of publicity would apply to all individuals or only those with 
commercially valuable personas and/or those who exploited their personas during 
life.226  Such a federal postmortem right of publicity provision would not alleviate 
the burdens imposed on interstate commerce by the postmortem right of publicity.  
However, it would remedy the dormant Commerce Clause violations raised by 
current state statutes.  One core concern underlying the dormant Commerce Clause 
doctrine is preventing individual states from usurping Congress’s enumerated 
constitutional responsibility of regulating interstate commerce.227  A federal 
postmortem right of publicity statute would ensure that Congress has properly 
considered the economic effects of a postmortem right of publicity, rather than 
allowing individual states to impose their policy preferences on other jurisdictions. 
Alternatively, Congress could pass legislation explicitly authorizing states to 
maintain their current postmortem right of publicity schemes.  The Supreme Court 
has held that “[i]f Congress ordains that the States may freely regulate an aspect of 
interstate commerce, any action taken by a State within the scope of the 
congressional authorization is rendered invulnerable to Commerce Clause 
challenge.”228  Thus, if Congress were to pass legislation expressly allowing for state 
legislation with regard to the postmortem right of publicity, current laws in place 
would no longer violate the dormant Commerce Clause.  Such an “authorization” 
statute would of course lack many of the benefits of a federal right of publicity law, 
such as uniformity, predictability, and the ability for different interest groups to make 
their voices heard in establishing the proper scope of the federal right of publicity.  It 
also seems more unlikely that Congress would take such an approach, though it is 
not without precedent.  For example, in Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, the 
Supreme Court held that discriminatory state taxes on insurance companies did not 
violate the dormant Commerce Clause because Congress had explicitly authorized 
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such taxes.229  Concerning federal “right-of-publicity authorization” legislation, 
Congress could even authorize state postmortem right of publicity statutes with the 
precondition that states first make some attempt to harmonize their right of publicity 
regimes.230  At the very least, such an “authorization” statute would guarantee that 
Congress has considered how the current milieu of state right of publicity laws are 
affecting interstate commerce and that it has determined that a federal right of 
publicity is not yet necessary. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This Note has examined how state postmortem right of publicity statutes run afoul 
of the dormant Commerce Clause.  Over the past century, the right of publicity has 
grown from a fairly circumscribed doctrine concerned with personal privacy and 
public image into a full-blown property right that can be used as a powerful tool to 
commoditize an individual’s persona.  The postmortem right of publicity, in 
particular, allows an individual’s estate to control the market for his or her likeness 
sometimes decades after that person has died.  As a result, the postmortem right of 
publicity can create significant burdens and restrictions on businesses engaged in 
interstate commerce.  As the PRINCE Act and New York’s proposed postmortem 
right of publicity bill show, more states are considering and enacting their own 
postmortem right of publicity laws, especially in the wake of local celebrity deaths 
and advocacy by actor and celebrity representatives.  But in today’s increasingly 
global and digital economy, the effects of these laws cannot easily be limited to the 
borders of the states who enact them.  As a result, the United States has developed 
an overlapping and burdensome patchwork of postmortem right of publicity 
regulations that any company operating over the Internet or interstate must traverse 
with caution.  In order to alleviate the burden these statutes impose on interstate 
commerce, federal postmortem right of publicity legislation is necessary.  It would 
bring much-needed attention to an increasingly powerful realm of property law and 
hopefully create greater consistency and predictability to how we are allowed to 
depict the dead. 
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